Specific Performance
Anthony T. Kronmant
In an important article,' Calabresi and Melamed distinguish
two different techniques for protecting legal entitlements. One they
call a "property" rule and the other a "liability" rule. According to
Calabresi and Melamed, a right or entitlement is protected by a
property rule when it can be appropriated by a non-owner only if2
he first purchases permission to do so from the owner of the right.
When a right is protected by a rule of this sort, one who appropriates
it without the owner's permission will always be subject to a special
sanction-typically, a fine or imprisonment.' If a right is protected
by a liability rule, in contrast, a non-owner who unilaterally appropriates it need only compensate the owner, after the taking, for any
loss the owner suffers.4 The compensatory amount which a nonowner must pay for taking a right protected by a liability rule is set
by a representative of the state rather than by the owner of the right
in a voluntary transaction between owner and taker.
Calabresi and Melamed attempt to explain why some legal
entitlements are protected by a property rule and others by a liability rule. They suggest that in certain cases the cost of negotiating
the voluntary transfer of a right may be sufficiently high to frustrate
the transfer. Where this is so, a property rule, which is intended to
encourage transfers of this sort, is likely to promote an inefficient
allocation of resources. This point is illustrated by automobile accidents and pollution torts.5 In both cases, a voluntary transfer of
entitlements is almost certain to be prohibitively expensive: in the
case of an automobile accident because of the cost of identifying the
victim beforehand, and in the case of pollution torts because of freet Assistant Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. I would like to thank Gerhard
Casper, Walter Hellerstein, Edmund Kitch, Thomas Jackson, William Landes, Richard Posner, George Priest, Antonin Scalia, and Franklin Zimring for their helpful comments on an

earlier draft of this article. I would also like to thank Ms. Brigitte Bell, a second-year student
at the University of Chicago Law School, for her valuable research assistance.
I Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability:One View of
the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972). They also discuss a third technique for protecting entitlements-inalienability. The law restricts or forbids the sale of inalienable rights. Id.
at 1111-15. For a treatment of property and liability rules from a philosophical perspective,
see R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 54-87 (1974).
2

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1092.

3 Id. at 1126. See also R. NoZICK, supra note 1, at 57.

Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1692.
Id. at 1108-09, 1115-24.
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rider and hold-out complications which are likely to make any negotiated settlement enormously difficult and time-consuming.
Where the costs of voluntarily transferring a particular entitlement are low, Calabresi and Melamed argue, economic considerations strongly support the use of a property rule to protect that
entitlement. This argument is illustrated by the use of property
rules in the criminal law: "[T]he thief or rapist . . . could have
negotiated [a voluntary transfer of what he takes] without undue
expense (at least if the good was one which we allowed to be sold at
all) because we assume he knew what he was going to do and to
whom he would do it." ' 7 In such cases, liability rules are inappropriate because they "represent only an approximation of the value
of the object to its original owner and willingness to pay such an
approximate value is no indication that it is worth more to the thief
than the owner." 8
In their discussion of property and liability rules, Calabresi and
Melamed do not consider one very important species of legal right:
the kind of right that is created by contractual agreement, the right
to the performance of a promise. All of the examples in their article
are drawn from the law of torts, crimes, or real property. Since
contract rights have special features that distinguish them from the
various entitlements created and protected by these other branches
of the law, it is appropriate to ask whether contract rights should
be protected by a property rule or a liability rule.
In contract law, a liability rule permits a promisor to breach his
promise provided he compensates the other party by payment of
money damages. The fundamental alternative to money damages,
in the law of contracts, is specific performance. A promise may be
said to be specifically enforceable when the law gives its owner, the
promisee, a right to require the actual (or "specific") performance
of the promise. The right to positively enjoin a promise, like the
right to negatively enjoin a nuisance, may be viewed as an entitlement protected by a property rule. In both cases, the owner of the
right is in a position to force the would-be taker to negotiate a
voluntary transfer of the particular entitlement. If the taker acts
unilaterally (by simply refusing to perform, or by continuing to
pollute), he can be compelled by an injunctive order to honor the
owner's entitlement; and if he then refuses to honor the injunction
itself, he may be forced to make a payment (not necessarily pecuniId. at 1126-27.
7 Id. at 1127.
Id. at 1125.
'

1978]

Specific Performance

ary) to the state or the promisee greater than that required to compensate the promisee for his loss.9 Moreover, if performance is still
possible, a supplemental injunction mandating performance will
likely issue, again backed up by civil and criminal contempt sanctions.
If one approaches the question from the theoretical perspective
developed by Calabresi and Melamed, there are two considerations
suggesting that all (or most) contract rights should be protected
with a property rule. First, a contract typically involves only two
parties.'" Where only two parties are involved, the special hold-out
and free-rider difficulties that plague multi-party negotiations do
not arise." Second, and more important, the parties to a contract
already know one another and so need not worry about the special
problems of identification arising, for example, in the case of automobile accidents. These considerations suggest that the costs of
negotiating a voluntary transfer of contract rights are likely to be
low. Following Calabresi and Melamed, this should be regarded as
2
a reason for protecting rights of this sort with a property rule.'
Instructive cases are collected in 0. Fiss, INJUNCTIONS 714-814 (1972).
" This is, of course, not true in every case. Perhaps the most important exception is the
third-party beneficiary contract. In this article, I ignore the complications posed by these
more elaborate contractual arrangements.
" This distinguishes a contract negotiation from the pollution case discussed in Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1106-08, and from at least some eminent domain proceedings. For a discussion of the conflicting philosophical ideals that have informed judicial
interpretation of the compensation clause, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
CONSTITUTION (1977).
12There is an additional consideration strengthening the case for protecting contractual

entitlements with a property rule. According to Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 110809, 1119, the use of a property rule in both automobile accidents and pollution torts is likely
to inhibit an efficient allocation of the resources involved. It is not obvious that specifically
enforcing all contractual entitlements would have similar misallocative consequences.
Suppose that A contracts with B to buy B's piano. Suppose, in addition, that A has the
right to specifically enforce B's promise. If C values the piano more than A, he will offer to
pay B a premium for breaking his contract with A, and if the premium is large enough, B
will be able to buy his way out of the contract, and the piano will go directly to C. Of course,
the premium may be too small to cover both the release payment A demands and the costs
of negotiating a settlement. If so, the piano will go to A, who will in turn sell it to C. Once
again, the piano ends up in the hands of C, the higher-valuing user, but this time after two
transfers rather than one. The allocative outcome is the same in both cases; the only difference is a distributional one.
The result, under a money damages rule, should be identical. If the difference between
C's offer and the original contract price exceeds what B must pay A in damages, B will breach
and the piano will go to C. However, the piano will remain in C's hands only if he values it
more than A. If A's actual loss-the amount he would have demanded for relinquishing his
right to B's performance in the first place-exceeds the value C places on the piano, A will
now contract to buy the piano from C. Of course, this will only happen if A's money damages
are undercompensatory (if they do not reflect his actual loss). But there is always a risk that
the representative of the state who determines the amount of the payment will underestimate
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This view, however, appears to have had little influence in
shaping our law of contract remedies.1 3 The normal remedy for
breach of contract is, of course, money damages.14 Specific performance is exceptional. 5 The Anglo-American law of contracts protects
most contract rights with a liability rule, only a few with a property
rule.
It is natural to wonder whether the peculiar mix of property and
liability rules in the law of contracts can be explained on economic
grounds. Although a great deal has been written about the efficiency
of our law of contract damages, this more basic question has been
largely ignored.' 6 The first two parts of this article argue that, in
the extent of the harm suffered by the injured party. The important point is that the piano
will go to the higher-valuing user, whether or not the damages awarded the original promisee
are compensatory.
One might argue that under a money damages rule the cost of moving resources to their
ultimate consumers will be less than what it would be if all contract rights were specifically
enforceable. It is true that a promisor who must perform or pay a penalty will be more likely
to attempt to buy his way out of a contract before breaching than a promisor who is only
required to pay damages if he fails to perform. In some cases, this will mean an additional
transaction which could be avoided under a money damages rule. In other cases, however, a
property rule may prevent the transfer of a particular resource to a lower-valuing user and
thus eliminate the necessity of an additional exchange shifting the resource back to the
original promisee. Furthermore, the onus of a property rule might give promisors an increased
incentive to carefully identify their various opportunities before committing themselves contractually-with the result that resources would be more likely to flow directly to highervaluing users. On balance, it is certainly not obvious that a decision to protect contractual
entitlements with a property rule would increase the total cost of moving resources to their
most efficient uses.
,1See generally Barbour, The History of Contract in Early English Equity, in OXFORD
STUDIES IN SOCIAL AND LEGAL HISTORY (1914); Washington, Damages in Contract at Common
Law (pts. 1-2), 47 & 48 LAw Q. REv. 345, 90 (1931-1932).
" 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968); 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 993 (1960); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145-47
(1970).
,1The limited use of specific performance is a fairly recent historical development. See

G.

TREITEL, THE LAW OF CONTRACT

834-41 (3d ed. 1970); Dawson, Specific Performance in

France and Germany, 57 MICH. L. REv. 495, 532, 537-38 (1959). This development has been
criticized as inconsistent with natural justice. Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Chicago Ry. Co., 163
U.S. 564, 600 (1896) (Fuller, C.J.). Not all legal systems draw the line between specific
performance and money damages in the same way. See R. POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 240 (1922); Beardsley, Compelling Contract Performance in France, 1
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 93 (1977); Dawson, supra; Grossfeld, Money Sanctions for
Breach of Contract in a Communist Economy, 72 YALE L.J. 1326, 1333 (1963); Treitel,
Remedies for Breach of Contract, in VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW
(ch. 16) 2 (1976).
16 See, e.g., Barton, The Economic Basis of Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. LEG.
STUD. 277 (1972); Birmingham, Damage Measures and Economic Rationality: The Geometry
of Contract Law, 1969 DUKE L.J. 49; Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damage Measures,
and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUTGERS L. REv. 273 (1970); Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility
and Related Doctrines in ContractLaw: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (1977);
Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1976). Professor Posner briefly
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general, the combination of property and liability rules employed in
the law of contracts makes economic sense. In Part III conventional
explanations for the courts' refusal to enforce private contractual
provisions purporting to grant the promisee a right to compel specific performance are skeptically examined. In the final part of the
paper, I criticize judicial willingness to permit a promisor to defeat
his promisee's property rule protection by transferring the promised
goods or services to a good faith purchaser. It is suggested that
economic considerations support the constructive trust approach to
this problem adopted by some courts.
I.

THE "UNIQUENESS"

TEST

Specific performance is an equitable remedy 7 which a court,
in its sound discretion," may grant a promisee whose money damages remedy is inadequate." The situations in which courts are
prepared to order specific performance are heterogeneous. Typical
situations include contracts for the sale of land;" contracts for the
discusses the more fundamental issue-whether there are economic consideratons that explain why the law of contracts provides for specific performance in some cases and money
damages in others. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw §§ 4.2, 4.12 (2d ed. 1977).
'1 E. FRY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § 3 (6th ed. 1921); J.
POMEROY, A TREATISE ON THE SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACTS § § 1-3 (3d ed. with J. Mann
1926); 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1418 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1968). See, e.g., Klein v. Shell

Oil Co., 386 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1967).
,8E.g., Lee v. Crane, 270 Ala. 651, 653, 120 So. 2d 702, 703 (1960). Although certain kinds
of contracts (such as contracts for the sale of land) are, as a general rule, specifically enforced,
courts do not feel bound by traditional categories and will sometimes exercise their discretion
to deny specific performance of an agreement that would normally be specifically enforceable.
See, e.g., Paddock v. Davenport, 107 N.C. 710, 12 S.E. 464 (1890) (specific performance of a
contract for the sale of an interest in land denied on the ground that money damages would
adequately compensate the vendee). See also cases cited at note 20 infra.
' "[We do not give specific relief ordinarily but only exceptionally where pecuniary
relief is considered inadequate." R. POUND, supra note 15, at 240. Money damages are generally regarded as inadequate when they are too difficult to assess. See City Stores Co. v.
Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(contract for a lease in a shopping center). The difficulties of assessing money damages are
likely to be especially acute in cases involving long-term output and requirements contracts.
See, e.g., American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Bunker Hill & Sullivan Mining & Concentrating
Co., 248 F. 172 (D. Ore. 1918). See generally E. FRY, supra note 17, at §§ 49-90; J. POMEROY,
supra note 17, at §§ 28-34, 47-50; RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 358 (1932); 11 S. WILUSTON,

supra note 14, at § 1418.
1 Contracts for the transfer of real property have traditionally been specifically enforced.
"Where land, or any estate therein, is the subject-matter of the agreement, the equitable
jurisdiction is firmly established." J. PoMERoY, supra note 17, at § 10. Not only are contracts
for the sale of land specifically enforced, covenants running with the land and options to
purchase land are specifically enforceable as well. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Brennan, 385 F.2d
951 (5th Cir. 1967) (covenant running with the land); Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170 (3d
Cir. 1966) (option to purchase real property); McCullough v. Newton, 348 S.W.2d 138 (Mo.
1961) (sale of land).
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sale of heirlooms, antiques, 2' and certain licenses 22 and patent
rights2 that can only be obtained from the promisor; contracts for
the sale of a majority of shares in a particular corporation;24 and
long-term output and requirements contracts. 25 Occasionally, an
More recently, however, courts have exhibited greater willingness to deny specific performance of contracts for the transfer of real property, on the ground that the plaintiff has
an adequate remedy at law. See Watkins v. Paul, 95 Idaho 499, 511 P.2d 781 (1973); Suchan
v. Rutherford, 90 Idaho 288, 295-96, 410 P.2d 434, 443 (1966); Duckworth v. Michel, 172 Wash.
234, 19 P.2d 914 (1933). In the two Idaho cases, the court asserted that the vendee's purpose
in entering the contract was not to obtain the land and put it to a specific use, but rather
pecuniary profit. For a general discussion of the problem, see J. DAwsON & W. HARVEY, CASES
ON CONTRACTS 180 (3d ed. 1977); Bird & Fanning, Specific Performance of Contracts to
Convey Real Estate, 23 Ky. L.J. 380 (1935) (approves the tendency of modern courts to assess
more carefully the adequacy of money damages in land cases).
21 Contracts involving heirlooms and antiques are specifically enforceable on the theory
that the article involved typically has sentimental significance and value over and above its
pecuniary worth. The classic case is Pusey v. Pusey, 23 Eng. Rep. 465 (1684), in which specific
performance was granted for the transfer of an ancient horn given the Pusey family by the
Danish King Canute. The horn had more than sentimental value, however. It signified conveyance of certain realty. See also Burr v. Bloomsburg, 101 N.J. Eq. 615, 33 A. 962 (1927)
(sale of a diamond ring); Falcke v. Gray, 62 Eng. Rep. 250 (1859) (sale of two china jars).
The court in Falcke, while denying specific performance on other grounds, said: "In the
present case the contract is for the purchase of articles of unusual beauty, rarity and distinction, so that damages would not be an adequate compensation for non-performance. . . .
62 Eng. Rep. at 252-53.
2 Cf. Nelson v. Richia, 232 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1956) (sale of a business with a licensed
trade name, buyer required to perform).
2 Cf. Patent & Licensing Corp. v. Olsen, 188 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1951) (employee ordered
to assign patents on process developed in course of employment to employer); McFarland v.
Stanton Mfg. Co., 53 N.J. Eq. 649, 33 A. 962 (1895) (patented improvements on a process
ordered handed over to transferee of original patent); Whitcomb v. Whitcomb, 85 Vt. 76, 81
A. 97 (1912) (partner ordered to assign patent to partnership that had equitable ownership
of the patent). See generally J. POMEROY, supra note 17, at § 20.
[I]t is clear that specific performance is a particularly appropriate remedy for
enforcement of "buy-sell" agreements of shares of stock of closely-held corporations.
Money damages would not be adequate. It is extremely difficult to determine the value
of stock in a closely-held corporation and money damages would not accomplish the
primary purpose of such. .
agreements-to prevent outsiders from entering the business.
In re Brown's Estate, 446 Pa. 401, 409, 289 A.2d 77, 81 (1972) (footnotes omitted). Cf. King
v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 565, 572 (7th Cir. 1971) (specific performance of an agreement to allow
the president of a corporation to purchase sufficient stock to retain control of the business);
Bumgardner v. Leavitt, 35 W. Va. 194, 203, 13 S.E. 67, 71 (1891) (specific performance would
be granted to defendant to prevent a takeover by antagonistic interests, therefore plaintiff is
entitled to specific performance on ground of mutuality of remedy). See generally E. FRY,
supra note 17, at §§ 1496-1529; J. POMEROY, supra note 17, at §§ 17-19.
2 See, e.g., Laclede Gas. Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) (supply of
gas to residential subdivisions); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (sale
of carrots, specific performance denied on other grounds); Hunt Foods v. D'Odisbo, 98 F.
Supp. 267 (N.D. Cal. 1951) (peaches); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Bunker Hill &
Sullivan Mining & Concentrating Co., 248 F. 172, 182-83 (D. Ore. 1918) (lead-silver ore);
Eastern Rolling Mill Co. v. Michlovitz, 157 Md. 51, 65-69, 145 A. 378, 383-85 (1929) (scrap
iron); Michigan Sugar Co. v. Falkenhagen, 243 Mich. 698, 220 N.W. 760 (1928) (sugar beets);
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employment 28 or construction2 contract will also be specifically enforced.
The most important common feature of these diverse cases is
the central role played by the idea of "uniqueness. ' '21If the "subject
St. Regis Paper Co. v. Santa Clara Lumber Co., 173 N.Y. 149, 65 N.E. 967 (1903). In many
cases, the grant of specific performance is coupled with an injunction forbidding transfer of
the goods to third parties. See generally 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 14, at § 1419B.
26 Specific performance of employment contracts has traditionally been denied on three
grounds: (1) the presumed adequacy of the plaintiff's legal remedy; (2) the difficulty of
supervision; and (3) the aura of involuntary servitude associated with the compulsion of
services. 11 S. WILISTON, supra note 14, at § 1423. See, e.g., Tucker v. Warfield, 119 F.2d 12
(D.C. Cir. 1941) (contract to take care of plaintiff and provide her with all the necessities of
life). Nevertheless, employment contracts are sometimes indirectly enforced through injunctions forbidding the defendant to perform similar work for anyone else. Lumley v. Wagner,
42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852). In one interesting case, the reason given for considering specific
enforcement of an employment contract was that the interest of the employee-who was to
be paid in stocks-was inextricably bound up with that of his employer. McCutcheon v.
National Acceptance Corp., 143 Fla. 663, 197 So. 475 (1940). Cf. In re Staklinski & Pyramid
Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) (arbitration award granting
specific enforcement of employment contract against employer upheld as not contrary to
public policy). See generally E. FaY, supra note 17, at §§ 110-15, 852-54; J. POMEROY, supra
note 17, at § 24; RESTATEMENT, supranote 19, at § 379; 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 14, at §
1423.
E.g., City Stores Co. v. Ammerman, 266 F. Supp. 766, 776-80 (D.D.C. 1967), af'd per
curiam, 394 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Construction contracts have generally been thought
to create special problems of judicial supervision. Nevertheless, construction contracts have
been specifically enforced when the construction materials were of a special type and could
be obtained only through the builder, Rector of St. David's v. Wood, 24 Ore. 396, 34 P. 18
(1893), or when it was held to be in the public interest to compel completion of the construction, Gas Securities Co. v. Antero & L.P. Reservoir Co., 259 F. 423 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
250 U.S. 667 (1919) (a reservoir construction project secured through public bonds and partially completed at the time of breach). See generally J. POMEROY, supra note 17, at § 23; 11
S. WILLISTON, supra note 14, at § 1422A.
The uniqueness test is explicitly incorporated in the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2716(1). According to the Official Comment, this section introduces a "new concept of what
are 'unique' goods." Under the rule stated in § 2-716(1):
Specific performance is no longer limited to goods which are already specific or ascertained at the time of contracting. . . . Output and requirements contracts involving a
particular or peculiarly available source or market present today the typical commercial
specific performance situation, as contrasted with contracts for the sale of heirlooms or
priceless works of art which were usually involved in the older cases.
U.C.C. § 2-716, Comment 2. If the Comment ended there; it could be concluded that the Code
has merely adopted a well-established principle, and given it a broader and economically
more sophisticated interpretation. But the Comment continues: "However, uniqueness is not
the sole basis of the remedy under this section, for the relief [specific performance] may also
be granted 'in other proper circumstances' and inability to cover is strong evidence of 'other
proper circumstances.'" Id. This suggests that the draftsmen contemplated a second, independent basis for awarding specific performance in particular cases. It is unclear, however,
what this independent basis might be. The problem of construing "other proper circumstances" may be avoided by reading it as nothing more than a restatement of the proposition
which (according to the Comment) is implicit in the Code's notion of uniqueness-that
uniqueness can only be determined by looking at "the total situation which characterizes the
contract." Id. Read in this way, § 2-716(1) states only one test, not two. Although this reading
treats "other proper circumstances" as nothing but a clarification of the uniqueness test, it
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matter of [a] contract is unique in character and cannot be duplicated" or if obtaining "a substantial equivalent involves difficulty,
delay, and inconvenience," a court will be more apt to compel
specific performance. "The fact that such a duplicate or equivalent
cannot be so obtained does not necessarily show that money damages are not an adequate remedy, but is a fact that tends strongly
in that direction."3 Conversely, if the subject matter of a contract
is such that "its substantial equivalent for all practical purposes is
readily obtainable from others than the defendant in exchange for
a money payment, this fact will usually in the absence of other
factors be sufficient to show that money damages are an adequate
'31
remedy for breach.
As the cases illustrate, the subject matter of a particular contract may be thought unique for a variety of reasons.3 2 Nevertheless,
courts often use the concept of uniqueness in a way which suggests
that it has some relatively fixed and well-recognized meaning. An
economic analysis of the law of specific performance must begin
with a workable conception of uniqueness.
In common disc6urse "unique" means without a substitute or
is fairly consistent with the developing caselaw. See Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522
F.2d 33, 40 (8th Cir. 1975); Kaiser Trading Co. v. Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 321
F. Supp. 923, 932-33 (N.D. Cal. 1970).
29 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, at § 1142.
30 Id.

3 Id. (emphasis added).
12 See, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (seeds for special
variety of carrots had been supplied by buyer); Huddleston"v. Williams, 267 Ala. 447, 103
So. 2d 809 (1958) (papers necessary for poodle registration); Elliott v. Hones, 11 Del. Ch. 343,
101 A. 872 (1917) (horse had particular qualities giving it promise of development into a
valuable race horse); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 208, 89 S.E.2d 64 (1955) (contract
to build and deliver legislative electronic voting machines not readily available on the open
market).
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, "the test of uniqueness . . . must be made in
terms of the total situation which characterizes the contract." U.C.C. § 2-716, Comment 2.
Thus, in De Moss v. Conart Motor Sales, Inc., 34 Ohio Op. 535,72 N.E.2d 158 (Ct. C.P. 1947),
aff'd on other grounds, 149 Ohio St. 299, 78 N.E.2d 675 (1948), the court granted specific
performance for the sale of a car because a manufacturing shortage had caused extensive
delays. Specific performance was also held appropriate where the plaintiff sought to purchase
a fiberglass boat manufacured only by the defendant, Gay v. Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc.,
14 U.C.C. Rep. 1335 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974); where the parties to the contract had stipulated
that the cotton in question was unique, R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co., Inc., v. Ferguson, 233 Ga.
962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975); where the competitor's toner and developer for a copying machine
were "distinctly inferior," Copylease Corp. v. Memorex Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); and where it was unlikely that the plaintiff could locate a "substantially identical piece
of used equipment [transformer] . . . in order to perform its contract with [a] third party,"
Ace Equipment Co., Inc. v. Aqua Chem., Inc., 73 Pa. D. & C. 300, 302 (Ct. C.P. 1975).
However, a substantial change in the price of substitutes is not itself ground for awarding
specific performance. Duval Co. v. Malcolm, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975); Hilmor Sales
Co. v. Helen Neuschaefer Div. of Supronico, Inc., 6 U.C.C. Rep. 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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equivalent.Y In the framework of conventional economic analysis,
however, the concept of uniqueness is troublesome. Although it
might seem reasonable to define the economic uniqueness of a good
in terms of its attributes or properties, this is not the definition
economists employ. Economists recognize this sort of uniqueness-they call it "technological" uniqueness-but they do not define the substitutability of goods in these terms. 4 For the purposes
of economic theory, the substitutability of a particular good is determined by observing consumer behavior, not by cataloguing the various properties of the good. If an alteration in the relative price of
one good affects the demand for another, then these two goods are
said to be economic substitutes. The degree of their substitutability
'35
is called the "cross-elasticity of demand.
On this view, every good has substitutes, even if only very poor
ones. Because all goods compete for consumer attention, a substantial change in the relative price of any good always affects the consumption of other goods. Economists are interested in determining
how great a change in the price of one good is required to effect a
change of given magnitude in the consumption of certain other
goods. But these are really questions of degree, resting on the underlying assumption-fundamental to economic theory-that all goods
are ultimately commensurable. 6 If this assumption is accepted, the
idea of a unique good loses meaning.
This point may be illustrated by a case that under present law
would almost certainly be held to involve a unique good.3 7 Suppose
that A contracts with Sotheby's to purchase the handwritten manuscript of Hobbes's Leviathan. If Sothby's refuses to performperhaps because it has a more attractive offer from someone elseA will undoubtedly be disappointed. Yet no matter how strong his
affection for Hobbes, it is likely there are other things that would
make A just as happy as getting the manuscript for the contract
13 See, e.g., 11 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 235 (1961) (defining "unique" as
"unequalled").
G. STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE 25-26 (3d ed. 1966).
Id. at 31-33.
This proposition has most often been explained and defended in utilitarian terms. See,
e.g., J. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL 42-52 (2d ed. 1946); P. SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF EcoNOMIC ANALYSIS 90-117 (1947). Recently, however, one economist has attempted to demonstrate that the law of the negatively sloped demand curve (on which the notion of universal
substitutability depends) may be "derived fundamentally from scarcity alone rather than
from an assumption [of the sort made in all utility theories] that behavior is 'rational,"' G.
BECKER, ECONOMIC THEORY 11 (1971). See id. at 11-23. See also Becker, IrrationalBehavior
and Economic Theory, 70 J. POL. ECON. 1 (1962).
2,Cf. Lowther v. Lord Lowther, 33 Eng. Rep. 230 (1806) (terms of sale of a painting by
Titian held proper issue for equity).
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price. For example, A may be indifferent between purchasing the
manuscript at the specified price and having twenty-five hours of
violin lessons for the same amount.3 If so, then A will be fully
compensated for the loss he suffers by Sotheby's breach 9 upon receiving the difference between the cost of twenty-five hours worth
of violin lessons and the contract price. However, despite the fact
that the manuscript has an economic substitute, a court would be
likely to order specific performance of the contract (assuming Sotheby's still had the manuscript in its possession)4" on the ground that
the subject matter of the contract is unique.
Pursuing the matter further, it is not difficult to see why A's
money damages remedy is likely to be inadequate and on the basis
of this insight to develop an economic justification for the uniqueness test. Under a money damages rule, a court must calculate the
amount Sotheby's is required to pay A to give A the benefit of his
bargain. The amount necessary to fully compensate A is equal to
the amount he requires to obtain an appropriate substitute. So in
fixing the amount Sotheby's must pay A, the court must first
determine what things A would regard as substitutes and then how
much of any particular substitute would be required to compensate
him for his loss.4'
In the hypothetical case, however, it would be very difficult and
expensive for a court to acquire the information necessary to make
these determinations. Perhaps some information of this sort would
3 The aim of compensation is to put the injured party in the position he would have been
in if the invasion of his legally protected interest had not occurred. So stated, the principle
of compensation determines the damages for a tortious injury as well as for breach of a
contractual obligation. The principle of compensation may be stated in economic terms:
"Something compensates X for Y's act if receiving it leaves X on at least as high an indifference curve as he would have been on, without it, had Y not so acted." R. NozicK, supranote
1, at 57.
" Of course, not every imaginable loss is compensable by a payment of money. How can
the loss of one's spouse or child be compensated in this way?
40 Specific performance is typically not granted when the seller is no longer in possession
of the promised property. Denton v. Stewart, 29 Eng. Rep. 1156 (Ch. 1786) (house had been
sold to a third party for valuable consideration). "Even though the impossibility of performing his contract is due to the defendant's own fault, equity will not decree that he shall do
what is clearly beyond his power." 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 14, at § 1422. But when
possible, courts will sometimes grant partial specific performance coupled with an abatement
in the price. See Skelly Oil Co. v. Ashmore, 365 S.W.2d 582 (Mo. 1963). If the seller has resold
the property, a court will occasionally cancel the second sale in order to grant specific performance to the first purchaser. In Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d 1119 (9th Cir. 1970), the court,
in order to enforce plaintiff shareholders' right of first refusal, cancelled a sale of stock to nonshareholders. See also Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 1966).
1 If there are several substitutes, the court must also identify the least costly one, for
the party in breach should not be required to pay more than the smallest amount necessary
to fully compensate the disappointed promisee.
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be produced by the parties. For example, A could introduce evidence to establish a past pattern of consumption from which the
court might draw an inference as to what would be a satisfactory
substitute for the manuscript. Sotheby's could then attempt to
rebut the evidence and establish some alternative theory of preferences and substitutes. But of course it would be time-consuming to
produce information this way, and any inference a court might draw
on the basis of such information would be most uncertain.
Moreover, this uncertainty cannot be avoided by simply looking to the selling price of other manuscripts or even the expected
resale price of the Hobbes manuscript itself (unless, of course, A is
a professional dealer) .42 It would be risky to infer the value A places
on the Hobbes manuscript from the value placed on it by others,43
and riskier still to infer it from the value others place on the manuscripts of, for example, Harrington's Oceana or Locke's Second
Treatise. If a court attempts to calculate A's money damages on the
basis of such information, there is a substantial probability that the
award will miss the mark and be either under- or overcompensatory.
Of course, if a court could accurately identify a substitute for
the manuscript, it could disregard the fact that A may value the
manuscript in excess of the price that he, or anyone else, has agreed
to pay for it. But where it is difficult to identify a satisfactory
substitute (as I assume it is here), the goal of compensation requires
that an effort be made to determine the value the promisee places
on the promisor's performance, as distinct from what the promisee,
or anyone else, has offered to pay for it.
42 If A is a professional dealer, interested in reselling the manuscript, it is perhaps
reasonable to treat his loss as equal to the difference between the contract price and the price
at which he could have sold it to someone else at the time of B's breach (or the time of
performance). Even in this case, however, money damages may be undercompensatory. This
would be so, for example, if A did not anticipate an immediate resale but planned, instead,
to hold the manucript as an investment property.
11 Suppose that A promises to pay $10 for the manuscript, but would only be willing to
sell it, if he already owned it, for $15. Suppose, in addition, that B receives an offer to sell
the manuscript to C for $18, and that C values it at $20. To fully compensate A, B should be
required to pay him $5. But it may be very difficult to estimate the value A places on the
manuscript. It will be tempting to give A the difference between the contract price and the
resale price, $8, but this will be overcompensatory. On the other hand, if C offers to pay $12
for the manuscript (still valuing the manuscript at $20), the same measure of damages will
be undercompensatory for A. A will receive just $2 in damages, will be unable to persuade B
to sell the manuscript for $15 or less, since C will bid the price up, and will be unable to
convince C-if C has obtained possession of the manuscript-to sell it for a similar amount.
In neither case will A get the manuscript.
Of course, if the manuscript has already been sold to a third party, a new set of considerations (involving the protection of good faith purchasers) must be taken into account. See text
and notes at notes 77-96 infra.
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Although it is true in a certain sense that all goods compete in
the market-that every good has substitutes"4-this is an empty
truth. What matters, in measuring money damages, is the volume,
refinement, and reliability of the available information about substitutes for the subject matter of the breached contract. When the
relevant information is thin and unreliable, there is a substantial
risk that an award of money damages will either exceed or fall short
of the promisee's actual loss. Of course this risk can always be
reduced-but only at great cost when reliable information is difficult to obtain. Conversely, when there is a great deal of consumer
behavior generating abundant and highly dependable information
about substitutes, the risk of error in measuring the promisee's loss
may be reduced at much smaller cost. In asserting that the subject
matter of a particular contract is unique and has no established
market value, a court is really saying that it cannot obtain, at reasonable cost, enough information about substitutes to permit it to
calculate an award of money damages without imposing an unacceptably high risk of undercompensation on the injured promisee.
Conceived in this way, the uniqueness test seems economically
sound."
The following case will illustrate this point. A contracts with B
for the purchase of 100 ball bearings. B breaches his promise to
deliver, and A sues. If there are two or more sellers of ball bearings,
and if there is substantial empirical evidence indicating that the
cross-elasticity of demand is very high for ball bearings offered by
different sellers, a court is warranted in assuming that most purchasers of ball bearings regard those sold by one seller as a satisfactory substitute for those sold by any other. For this reason, a court
may also justifiably assume that a compensatory damages payment
to A which enables him to purchase ball bearings from someone
other than B (without incurring costs in excess of those he had
originally anticipated), is likely to put A in precisely the position he
would have been in had B performed his promise. The better the
evidence that most buyers regard one brand of ball bearings as a
4' See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 412 (1911)
(Holmes, J., dissenting).
" See generally G. STIGLER, supra note 34, at 85-89. In a perfectly competitive market,
the goods offered by different sellers are assumed to be homogeneous. Even where two or more
goods are not homogeneous, however, there will be many circumstances in which they may
usefully be characterized as belonging to the same market or, if the term "market" is reserved
for the limiting case of perfect competition, as members of a "product group." See C. FERGUSON & J. GOULD, MICROECONoMic THEORY 315 (1975). In defining different product groups, one
important factor is likely to be the volume and refinement of our information about the crosselasticity of demand for particular goods.
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substitute for another, the more confident a court can be that it has
correctly calculated the magnitude of the promisee's loss.
It is of course true that even with very complete information
about substitutes, a court may err in calculating money damages.
It might be that A prefers B's ball bearings to those of any other
seller because he believes they will last longer. Normally this preference would be reflected in the market price for B's ball bearings; if
one brand of ball bearings lasts longer than others, it should command a premium of some sort. But this may not be the case. It may
be that A's knowledge and experience with B's ball bearings are not
shared by other purchasers. If A attaches some special value to B's
ball bearings not reflected in their price, he will be undercompensated if his damages are calculated on the assumption that the cost
of a substitute is the cost of obtaining ball bearings from another
seller. To prevent undercompensation, A must prove that he will
suffer a special loss as a result of B's breach, but this may be difficult and costly to establish.
The conclusion to be drawn from this analysis is a simple one.
Whenever a court calculates money damages, there is some risk that
it will undercompensate the injured party." But the magnitude of
this risk is inversely related to the completeness and reliability of
the information on which the court bases its award. At one extreme,
where there is a well-developed market generating evidence of substitutability, this risk is minimal. At the other extreme, where there
is no market or at most a few isolated transactions, this risk is
substantial. There is a point between these two extremes at which
the risk becomes unacceptably large (or, what amounts to the same
thing, at which the risk can only be reduced by incurring unacceptable costs). This is the point separating those contracts that are
specifically enforceable from those that are not-the point to which
the uniqueness test obliquely refers.
There is an additional, perhaps less obvious, reason why money
damages are most likely to be undercompensatory when the subject
matter of a contract is unique. In searching for a particular good, a
consumer will almost always incur certain costs-the costs of locating the good, obtaining information about it, and so on.47 When
these costs are incurred before formation of a contract, they are
generally not compensable under a money damages rule.4" Under a
46 Calabresi and Melamed make this point in the context of criminal sanctions. See
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1125.
47

G.

STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY

43 See

171-90 (1968).

Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey, 265 Ill. App. 542, 553 (1932); 5 A.
supra note 14, at §§ 992, 1034.
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money damages rule, a disappointed promisee is usually unable to
recover pre-contractual search costs, and is limited, instead, to compensation for the increased cost of obtaining a substitute after the
promisor breaches.
Where a good is not unique, information acquired in searching
for the good is likely to have -some independent usefulness, which
will survive a breach by the promisor. For example, if A wishes to
purchase ball bearings, he will first obtain information about the
ball bearing market. If he then makes a contract with B, which B
breaches, A will of course have to obtain some additional information before he can-arrange for a substitute purchase.49 But much of
the information acquired prior to his contract with B will still have
value for A-it will still be economically useful. On the other hand,
where A contracts for the purchase of a unique good, say, a one-ofa-kind stamp, this is less likely to be the case. A may have expended
a substantial sum in locating the stamp, and although it is possible
that some of the information acquired in the course of his search will
be generally useful, it is more likely that much of the information
is valuable to A only because it aided the discovery of the stamp in
question.
Under a money damages rule, A will not be compensated for
these search costs if his seller breaches. But of course he will be
compensated (that is, he will obtain the desired return) if he can
compel specific performance of the contract. That pre-contractual
search costs are not compensable under a money damages rule is
less worrisome when'the information generated by the search represents a capital stock that can be exploited in subsequent transactions. 50 But when it does not, the likelihood is increased that money
damages will be undercompensatory.5 1
11For example, A may need to locate another seller. If he already knows several sellers
of ball bearings, A may have to acquire only a small amount of new information before
arranging a substitute transaction (looking up the telephone number of one of B's competitors, confirming price and delivery terms, and so forth). Before contracting with B, however,
A is likely to have obtained a great deal of general information about the properties and
relative advantages of different sorts of ball bearings, and this information will continue to
be of use after B's breach.
10If the information represents a capital stock of this sort, its value must be amortized
over a number of individual transactions.
51As part of a money damages award, a court could include compensation for the estimated cost of finding a substitute even where the subject matter of the particular contract is
unique. But when the promised performance is unique, the cost of locating a substitute will
be difficult to estimate, and the likelihood is rather high that any court-determined award
will be undercompensatory. Of course a court could simply give the promisee carte blanche
to locate a satisfactory substitute on his own and then recover his search costs from the
promisor. This is an untenable alternative, however, for it would encourage an overinvestment in searching and invite fraud by the promisee. See alsd note 41 supra.
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The uniqueness test reflects the unwillingness of courts to impose a risk of undercompensation on promisees when that risk is
substantial. What justifies this reluctance? One plausible answer is
that a promisor should not be permitted to benefit from his own
misconduct by placing that risk on someone who is, after all, an
innocent victim of his breach.
This justification is attractive because it appeals to a powerful
moral sentiment. Unfortunately, when stated in its most abstract
form, it proves too much. If the fact of breach is an adequate reason
for protecting the promisee from a risk of undercompensation, it is
unclear why a promisor should ever be permitted to substitute
money damages for the actual performance of his obligation. The
moral justification is not wrong; it is merely unhelpful since it fails
to explain why some contracts are specifically enforceable and others are not. Before a court concludes that it would be wrong to
impose a particular risk on the promisee, it should first determine
that the promisee has not agreed to bear the risk, nor been compensated for doing so. The moral justification for specific enforcement
presupposes a solution to this initial problem of risk allocation.
A second, essentially economic, justification for the uniqueness
test consists in showing that the test draws the line between specific
performance and money damages in the way that most contracting
parties would draw it were they free to make their own rules concerning remedies for breach and had they deliberated about the
matter at the time of contracting. If this is true, the uniqueness test
promotes efficiency by reducing the costs of negotiating contracts."
In general, this way of thinking about the rules of contract law
requires consideration of the ex ante interests of parties engaged in
a hypothetical bargaining process, struggling with a problem of rational choice under conditions of uncertainty. As I shall attempt to
show in the next section, an analysis based upon ex ante considerations does suggest, if only somewhat tentatively, that contracting
parties would be more likely to provide for specific performance
where the subject matter of their contract is unique, and for money
damages where it is not.
Ex Ante Interests of Promisor
and Promisee

II.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND THE

When would the parties to a contract freely agree to a judicially
52

See generally R. PosNER, supra note 16, at 69.
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enforceable 3 provision giving the promisee an option5 4 to specifically
enforce the other party's promise? Other things equal, a promisee
will always prefer to have such a provision included in the contract
for it gives him an additional right which he would not otherwise
possess. Other things equal, a promisor will always prefer a contract
without such a provision-a contract, in other words, which he may
unilaterally breach on the condition that he make a subsequent
compensatory payment to the promisee. Consequently, a promisee
intent upon writing a specific performance provision-a property
rule-into the contract will have to pay to secure the promisor's
consent. Similarly, a promisor must make a payment of some sortI5
in order to exclude a provision for specific enforcement from the
contract. If and only if the benefit which the promisee realizes from
a specific performance provision exceeds the cost of the provision to
the promisor will the provision be included in the final contract.
When the subject matter of a contract is unique, the risk is
greater that the promisee's money damage remedy will be undercompensatory." Since a right to compel specific performance reduces this risk, promisees-as a class-should be willing to pay
more for a provision giving them a right of this sort when there is
no developed market generating information about the value of the
subject matter of their contract.
However, if a specific performance provision is likely to be more
beneficial to a promisee when the subject matter of his contract is
unique, it is also likely to be more costly to his promisor under the
same circumstances. In the first place, a right in the promisee to
compel specific performance increases the probability of costly negotiations for transfer of the promisee's contract rights.57 This of
13This is a counterfactual assumption. See text and notes at notes 62-69 infra.
" The provision should be thought of as an option because a promisee who is entitled to
specific performance may always forego this right and pursue a money damages remedy
instead.
Although the payment will probably assume the form of a straightforward reduction
in the contract price, it may be made in other ways as well (for example, by the inclusion of
warranty or delivery terms more favorable to the promisee).
0 See text and notes at notes 41-51 supra.
51 Of course, the inclusion of a specific performance provision will not make a voluntary
transfer of the promisee's contract rights inevitable. The promisor may always breach without
having first negotiated his release. On the whole, however, it is more likely that the promisor
will attempt to buy his way out of the contract before breaching under a specific performance
rule than under a money damages rule. See text and notes at notes 1-9 supra.
One complication not discussed in this article concerns post-breach negotiations. Under
either a money damages rule or a specific performance rule, negotiations of this sort are likely
to occur if both parties think it in their best interest to avoid litigation. However, the parties
may be more likely to conduct post-breach negotiations (rather than litigate or do nothing)
under one rule than under the other. This will depend upon the predicted costs of negotiating
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course always reinforces the promisor's preference for a money damages rule. However, a promisor is likely to regard this reason as
especially compelling where the subject matter of his contract is
unique, since the lack of information about substitutes will almost
certainly make the parties' negotiations longer and more complicated and thus more costly.
Second, if the promisee is entitled to specifically enforce the
promisor's obligation, the promisor who wishes to breach will have
to make a release payment to the promisee and buy his way out of
the contract. The amount of the release payment demanded by the
promisee will be greater than what the promisor would have to pay
the promisee under a money damages rule." This is so whether or
not the subject matter of the contract is unique. But the difference
between what the promisee would accept in exchange for a release
and what he may be expected to receive under a court-administered
money damages rule is likely to be larger where the subject matter
of his contract is unique, because the risk that court-awarded damages will be undercompensatory is greater. For these two reasons, a
specific performance provision will be more expensive to the promisor when the subject matter of his contract is unique.
Thus far, it would appear that the benefits to the promisee and
the costs to the promisor of a specific performance provision are
proportional; both are greater when the subject matter of the contract is unique. There is, however, an additional consideration influencing their ex ante deliberations that provides some basis for
thinking that the parties to a contract will be more likely to provide
for specific performance when the subject matter of their agreement
is unique.
The cost of a specific performance provision to the promisor will
be determined, in part, by his own estimate of the likelihood that
he will want to breach the contract. If he fully intends to perform,
a settlement and the anticipated benefits of litigation in each case. These problems are
sufficiently complicated to warrant separate treatment, but I do not believe they affect the
basic soundness of my argument.
11The amount of the release payment will also be greater than the benefits the promisee
expects from performance. There will, of course, always be a ceiling on what the promisor
will agree to pay the promisee. This ceiling will be determined by two things: the penalty
the promisor will incur if he breaches without having purchased a release from the promisee,
and the amount he stands to lose if he performs the contract. The promisor will never pay
the promisee more than the lesser of these two amounts for a release.
The amount which the promisor actually pays the promisee will fall somewhere between
the maximum payment he is prepared to make, and the minimum payment the promisee is
prepared to accept (assuming, of course, that the former exceeds the latter-if it does not,
there can be no negotiated release). This price will be determined primarily by the bargaining
skills and relative informational advantages of the parties.
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and thinks breach unlikely, a promisor will be less hostile to a contract with a specific performance provision than he would otherwise
be. One important factor influencing the promisor's thinking in this
regard is the probability that he will receive a better offer for his
goods or services in the interim between formation of the contract
and performance. The higher the probability, the greater the likelihood he will want to breach. The probability of receiving an attractive alternative offer may be especially low where the subject matter
of the contract is unique." In this case there is by definition no
developed market, transactions are spotty at best, and therefore a
promisor will often justifiably think it highly unlikely that he will
receive any alternative offer (let alone a better one) for the promised
goods or services. Indeed, where the subject matter of his contract
is genuinely unique, a promisor may estimate the likelihood of a
preferable alternative offer as close to zero, and thus be nearly indifferent as to what remedies the promisee will enjoy in the highly
unlikely event of breach.
Although the promisor thinks breach highly improbable, the
promisee may not. Despite the promisor's insistence that he intends
to perform, the promisee may be skeptical. As long as he is anxious
about the promisor's performance, the promisee will be concerned
about the adequacy of his own remedies, and where the subject
matter of his contract is unique he will likely have a decided preference for a contract that gives him the right to specifically enforce
the other party's promise. Consequently, in the case of a contract
for a unique good or service, the benefits the promisee derives from
a specific performance provision are apt to outweigh its costs to the
promisor, who, free of doubts about his own reliability, may regard
the inclusion of such a provision as a relatively costless way of
enticing the promisee to enter the contract on advantageous terms.
In the case of a contract for non-unique goods or services, by
contrast, the existence of a developed market increases the likelihood that the promisor will receive alternative offers before he has
performed the contract. The promisor will therefore be anxious to
retain the freedom and flexibility enjoyed under a money damages
rule.
Moreover, the promisor will be especially anxious in this case
' This conclusion does not ineluctably follow from the definition of uniqueness. There
may be great demand for a good in short supply. For example, there may be several collectors
willing to pay more than the contract price for a manuscript of Hobbes's Leviathan. In the
case of currently produceable goods, however, widespread demand for a good should lead to
increased production of the good. So in the typical commercial context, the assertion seems
plausible.
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to avoid the additional transaction costs that would be incurred if
he had to negotiate a voluntary transfer of the promisee's contract
rights. Although these costs will tend to be smaller where the subject matter of the contract is not unique, they can never be less than
some fixed minimum (the cost of contacting the promisee, notifying
him of an intention to breach, obtaining a release statement of some
sort, and so on). Where there is an established market in the goods
or services involved, prices will ordinarily be grouped rather closely
around a single point. The probability is therefore greater that any
alternative offer the promisor does receive will not be sufficiently
high to cover the cost of negotiating a release plus the amount he
must pay the promisee for the release. Thus the likelihood increases
that a promisor who has agreed to a specific performance provision
will find himself in the undesirable position of having to decline an
alternative offer that he would accept under a money damages rule.
In some cases the alternative offer will cover the release payment
but will be refused solely because the transaction costs of negotiating a transfer of the promisee's contract rights are prohibitively
high. The promisor should therefore be willing to make a small
payment to the promisee, perhaps in the form of a slightly reduced
contract price, in order to exclude a specific performance provision
and thus avoid these potential transaction costs. Because the transaction costs avoided by the promisor would not have benefited the
promisee, the latter will be better off with the reduced contract price
if he regards the risk of undercompensation under a money damages
rule as minimal. The promisee will generally regard this risk as
slight where there is a developed market generating information
about suitable substitutes.
In sum, promisors and promisees will typically favor a money
damages rule if the subject matter of their contract is not unique.
When the contract is for unique goods or services, on the other hand,
the benefit to the promisee of a specific performance provision is
likely to be substantial and the promisor may well regard his own
breach as only a remote possibility, so the opposite conclusion seems
more plausible. There is thus some basis for believing the uniqueness test reflects the typical solution that contracting parties would
arrange for themselves in light of their ex ante interests.
IlI.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT

I have argued that ex ante considerations provide some basis
for thinking the uniqueness test is economically rational. 0 The argu41See text and notes at notes 52-59 supra.
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ment attempted to show that if contracting parties were entirely
free to select their own remedies, their choice would generallly correspond to the mix of property and liability rules adopted by the law
of contracts. But ex ante arguments for the efficiency of a particular
legal rule assume that individuals remain free to contract around
that rule, and a legal system that denies private parties the right to
vary rules in this way will tend to be less efficient than a system that
adopts the same rules but permits contractual variation."
This raises an important question. If, under the uniqueness
standard, a promisee does not have the right to specifically enforce
a particular promise, can he create a right of this sort by private
agreement?" It is easy to imagine situations in which a promisee
might wish to do this. For example, A may wish to enter a specifically enforceable contract for the purchase of ball bearings because
he believes that special considerations, which will be difficult to
establish in a lawsuit, are likely to make his normal money damages
remedy undercompensatory. Similarly, some sellers of ball bearings may be willing to agree to a specific performance provision in
order to secure a better contract price or a new customer. For example, a new entrant in an industry, lacking an established reputation, may conclude that agreeing to a specific performance provision is the least costly way to communicate to prospective clients
his confidence in his ability to perform.
In the well-known case of Stokes v. Moore,"'the plaintiffs, partners operating a small loan business, hired and later dismissed defendant Stokes. They then sued to enforce a covenant not to compete, which had been incorporated in the contract of employment.
The contract contained a clause stating that if Stokes breached his
promise not to compete, "a restraining order or injunction [might]
be issued and entered against [him] in any court of equity jurisdiction."6 4 Although it affirmed the trial judge's decision to issue a
temporary injunction, the Supreme Court of Alabama viewed unfavorably the parties' attempt to create a right to injunctive relief by
private agreement:
We do not wish to express the view that an agreement for the
issuance of an injunction, if and when a stipulated state of facts
Posner & Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Eco-

',

nomic Analysis,, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 83, 89 (1977); R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1

(2d ed. 1977).
62 Clearly a promisee of a contract that would be specifically enforceable can agree to
give up his right to compel performance.
63 262 Ala. 59, 77 So. 2d 331 (1955).
" Id. at 61, 77 So. 2d at 334.
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arises in the future, is binding on the court to that extent. Such
an agreement would serve to oust the inherent jurisdiction of
the court to determine whether an injunction is appropriate
when applied for and to require its issuance even though to do
so would be contrary to the opinion of the court. 5
The court added, however, that "the provision for an injunction is
important in its influence upon an exercise of the discretionary
power of the court to grant a temporary injunction."6
The few cases directly addressing this question reach a similar
result. 7 A private agreement that purports to give one party the
right to specifically enforce the promise of another will be given
some weight by courts in deciding whether to grant injunctive relief.
But no court will consider itself foreclosed by the parties' contract
from refusing specific relief. A contractual provision accompanied
by a lengthy description of those aspects of the transaction that
make specific performance desirable is likely to carry more weight
than a provision unadorned by supporting explanation. But in no
event will the contract provision prevent a court from independently
determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.69
Perhaps judicial unwillingness to honor provisions such as the
one in Stokes reflects a desire to avoid private abuse of a powerful
and intrusive remedy. This is a legitimate concern. But if the purpose in scrutinizing a private agreement of the Stokes variety is to
prevent abuse by an overreaching promisee, this end could be served
as adequately and more directly by other legal tools-for example,
,s Id. at 64, 77 So. 2d at 335.
I8
Id.

See generally McNeil, Power of Contractand Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495,
520-23 (1962). Professor McNeil collects the principal cases in notes 88-92 of his article. See
also Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C. 2d 203 (Ct. C.P. 1956) (refusing to enforce a contractual provision purporting to give the seller of refrigeration equipment the right on buyer's
default to confess judgment against the buyer for the full amount of the unpaid contract
price).
pc See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts
Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the
73 YALE L. J. 199, 252 (1963).
Two,
Article
for
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap
" This is more frequently expressed by saying that specific performance is a discretionary remedy, and that "the right to specific performance is not absolute, like the right to
recover the legal judgment." POMEROY, supra note 17, at § 35. See also id. at § 46. It is well
established that "[n]either party to a contract can insist, as a matter of right, upon a decree
for its specific performance." Snell v. Mitchell, 65 Me. 48, 50 (1876). Only if a promise would
be specifically enforced in the absence of a contractual provision purporting to give the
promisee the power to enjoin its performance, will a court compel the promisor to do what
he initially agreed to do and not permit him to substitute money damages: "If one who
contracts to render personal service agrees that in case of breach the remedies of specific
performance and imprisonment shall be available to the employer, the agreement would not
be effective." 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, at § 1432.
7

The University of Chicago Law Review

[45:351

by traditional common law doctrines of fraud, duress, and good
faith. 70 If the concern is abuse of the contracting process, courts
should focus on the voluntariness of the parties' agreement.
It may be, however, that courts prohibit the private creation of
injunctive remedies not because specific performance provisions
evidence some procedural unfairness in the parties' dealings, but
rather because they are perceived to be substantively unacceptable
limitations on personal freedom. A provision of the kind involved in
Stokes might be viewed as a modified contract of self-enslavement,
an attempt to transfer an entitlement whose transfer is prohibited
by law (an "inalienable" right or entitlement in the scheme proposed by Calabresi and Melamed). 71 This idea is echoed in some of
the older specific performance cases involving construction and
72
employment contracts.

Such an argument carries little weight in a case like Stokes,
where the promise to be enforced is a negative one-a promise to
refrain from doing something. More importantly, the argument is
overdrawn. It is true that certain forms of domination (for example,
slavery and peonage) are regarded as inherently bad. Our legal system prohibits these forms of domination, whether they are created
by consensual act or by force. On the other hand, there are many
relations of domination recognized and protected by law so long as
they are voluntarily established and maintained. The relation created by a contract of employment is an important example of legally
protected domination.
The nature, completeness, and duration of self-imposed limitations on personal freedom determine their legal and moral acceptability. Slavery is objectionable largely because it involves near-total
control. By contrast the domination an employer exercises is partial
and limited-the employer only controls certain aspects of his employee's life. Nevertheless, employees are not generally required by
judicial order to submit to employer control. The judicial order, it
may be argued, makes a crucial difference: if the employment relation is created or maintained by the threat of judicial sanctions, it
is almost certain to be plagued by acrimony and ill-will. But although the unpleasantness of a forced employment relation should
certainly be taken into account by an employer contemplating a suit
for specific performance, it should not be a basis for refusing to
impose such a relation upon parties who have agreed to an injunc7'See Epstein,

Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal,18 J. LAw & ECON. 293 (1976).
7 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1111-15.
72 See 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 14, at § 1423.
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tive provision in their contract. Moreover, if the party in breach
anticipates that the relation will be unbearable, he can buy his
release from the contract.
Judicial insistence that the specific enforcement of certain contracts would create an objectionable form of personal servitude is
made yet more puzzling by the numerous cases in which courts have
been perfectly willing to negatively enjoin the party in breach from
73
employing his time or talents save in performance of the contract.
This sort of decree will often have the same effect as a positive
injunction to perform.
There is another common explanation for the reluctance of
courts to enforce private injunctive agreements: the specific enforcement of contracts (especially employment and construction contracts) entails special administrative costs which normally can be
avoided under a money damages rule, and private individuals
should not be allowed to shift the special costs associated with this
form of relief to the taxpayers who subsidize the legal system. 74 The
assumption on which this argument rests, however, may be mistaken. It is ancient dogma that specific performance necessarily
means increased judicial involvement in the enforcement and supervision of contractual duties. This might be true, but so might the
opposite conclusion: if all promises were specifically enforceable, or
if private parties were permitted to contract into a specific performance rule at their discretion, a resulting increase in the voluntary
transfer of contract rights might lower the number of breaches-and
perhaps even of lawsuits-and in this way reduce the actual involvement of courts in contractual relationships.
In comparing the administrative costs, broadly defined, of a
property rule mandating specific performance with a liability rule
directing an award of money damages, the following factors must be
73See, e.g., Philadelphia Ball Club v. LaJoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 A. 973 (1902).
11See, e.g., Marble Co. v. Ripley, 77 U.S. 339, 358-59 (1870); Northern Delaware Indus.
Dev. Corp. v. E.W. Bliss Co., 245 A.2d 431 (Del. Ch. 1968); Edelen v. Samuels, 126 Ky. 295,
306-07, 103 S.W. 360, 363 (1907). NorthernDelaware,which denied specific performance of a
"massive, complex, and unfinished construction contract," has been vigorously criticized.
Comment, Specific Performance of Construction Contracts-Archaic Principles Preclude
Necessary Reform, 47 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1025, 1029-33 (1972).

In recent years, courts have exhibited greater willingness to grant specific performance
in situations in which the remedy has traditionally been disfavored on the grounds that it is
either too intrusive or too difficult to administer. See In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc. &
Iris Constr. Corp., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960) (enforcement of
an arbitration award ordering specific performance of a contract to construct a portion of a
shopping center); In re Staklinski & Pyramid Elec. Co., 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188
N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959) (enforcement of arbitration award ordering employer to reinstate a
discharged employee).
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taken into account: (1) the frequency of litigation under both rules;
(2) the administrative cost of resolving litigated disputes under both
rules; (3) the portion of the administrative costs involved in dispute
resolution borne by the parties and the portion borne by society
under both rules; (4) the likelihood and cost, under each rule, of
pretrial settlement; and (5) special institutional costs, such as the
potential loss in court prestige that results from non-compliance
with a direct order to perform, and the cost of invoking the court's
contempt powers.
To say the least, it is unclear how these administrative costs
add up under the two rules. Until these questions have been explored, it is unwise to assume that the legal invalidity of private
agreements purporting to create a right of specific enforcement is
justified on the ground that specific relief is a more costly remedy
than money damages and that a greater portion of the costs of
specific performance is borne by third parties.
A promisee could attempt to achieve indirectly the special protection associated with a property rule by insisting, as a condition
of entering the contract, that the other party promise to pay a penalty upon breach-a penalty in excess of any damages payment
necessary to compensate the promisee. A provision of this sort, if
enforceable, would have the same effect as the sanctions that back
up both injunctive orders and criminal prohibitions: it would encourage the prospective taker of an entitlement to purchase the
entitlement from its owner in a voluntary market transaction. However, a contractual provision that is deliberately designed to be
penal will not be enforced.7 5 The legal prohibition of penal clauses
is an important obstacle facing parties who wish to contract into a
71The enforcement of penal provisions has been carefully discussed, from an economic
point of view, in a recent, and excellent, article. See Goetz & Scott, Liquidated Damages,
Penalties,and the Just CompensationPrinciple:Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and
a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. Rlv. 554 (1977). Goetz and Scott argue that the
"penalty rule" (the rule that a liquidated damages provision will not be enforced if it is penal
in nature) is economically unsound since "its uncritical application frequently induces a
costly re-examination of the [parties'] initial allocation of risks and may also deny the nonbreaching party either adequate compensation for the harm caused by the breach or the
opportunity to insure optimally against such harm." Id. at 556. They suggest that "the
modern development of unconscionability" offers "a less costly alternative to the sweeping
invalidation powers exercised under the penalty rule." Id. at 594.
In their attack on the penalty rule, Goetz and Scott emphasize the importance of what
they call "non-compensable idiosyncratic value." I have described the same phenomenon in
this article as the "risk of undercompensation." See text and notes at notes 41-46 supra. The
analysis of penalty clauses Goetz and Scott advance in their article complements, in many
ways, my treatment of specific performance, and I find myself in general agreement with both
their theoretical conclusions and proposals for change.
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property rule. 6
In sum, although the parties to a contract may have legitimate
reasons for wishing to contract into a property rule, the courts will
"' Hostility to the use of penal clauses might be based in part upon the conviction that
breaking a promise and committing a crime are qualitatively different wrongs and that the
legal system ought to prevent private individuals from obliterating the line between them.
This conviction is more puzzling than it first appears. Crimes and breaches of contract are
both invasions of legally protected interests. In both cases the taker typically knows in
advance whose right he is invading and has the time to negotiate a voluntary transfer of that
right. Given this important similarity, one might conclude that the right to the performance
of a promise and the right to be free from criminal attack should be protected in the same
manner.
I have argued that a mix of property and liability rules appears to be the best way of
protecting contract rights. See text and notes at notes 37-59 supra. The criminal law could
adopt a similar mix: crimes involving the appropriation of a unique good (for example, rape
or murder) would be punished by imprisonment or fine while crimes involving the taking of
a non-unique good (for example purse-snatching) would give rise only to a claim for compensation. Of course, the criminal law does not employ this approach-nearly all rights to be
free from crime are protected by a property rule.
Focusing on the similarity between breaking a promise and committing a crime conceals
differences of a more important kind, differences which explain why property rules are used
more sparingly in contract law than in criminal law. To explore these differences fully is
beyond the scope of this article, but a few suggestive comments can be made. The widespread
use of property rules in the criminal law might be explained on the ground that criminal
takings not only harm the victim, but inspire fear in the community. Cf. Michelman,
Property, Utility and Fairness:Comments on the Ethical Foundationsof "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. Rlv. 1165, 1214 (1967) (discusses "demoralization" resulting from
injury inflicted by "deliberate social action"). To some extent, however, general confidence
among promisees is undermined whenever a contract is broken. See Llewellyn, What Price
Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 725 n.47 (1931). Of course the costs
to the community of a crime may be much greater than the costs of a breach of contract
because a crime is usually thought to be a more alarming invasion of rights than breach of a
contractual obligation.
Many crimes exhibit three features which help explain this perception. First, a criminal
may well avoid detection, but a promisor will rarely be able to conceal his breach from the
promisee. For this reason, the punishment for a crime must be increased to reflect the risk of
non-apprehension, but damages for breach of contract need not be likewise inflated. See
generally Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968). Moreover, even if apprehended, a criminal may have disposed of the property acquired in the crime and is likely to be insolvent, Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1125
n.69; thus compensation from the criminal is often impossible.
In the second place, breach of contract rarely entails a risk of physical violence; a criminal taking often does. Most people are likely to view their own life and physical well-being
as paradigmatic examples of unique goods. Potential victims of crime are thus justifiably
concerned that they may suffer a noncompensable loss.
Third, the relation between promisor and promisee is almost always voluntarily established. In contrast, most crimes can be committed by strangers. A taking which occurs in the
context of a voluntarily created relationship often seems less offensive than one which does
not. Perhaps this is because we believe an individual has greater control ovr the risks to
which he is exposed in the former situation than he does in the latter; perhaps because a
taking by a stranger is thought to involve some additional harm to the special set of interests
defined by the elusive concept of privacy.
These three features distinguish most serious criminal takings from breaches of contracts. They also help explain and justify the widespread use of property rules in the criminal
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generally not enforce a specific performance provision unless the
contract would be specifically enforceable without it. The reluctance of courts to enforce such provisions reffects concern that recognition of a private power of injunction would sanction a morally
offensive form of involuntary servitude and increase judicial involvement in the enforcement and supervision of contractual obligations. I have suggested that the former rationale is overdrawn and
without much force in most cases in which parties to a contract
knowingly and voluntarily agree to a specific performance provision,
and I have argued that the latter justification is neither intuitively
compelling nor empirically established. On the other hand, economic considerations suggest that the parties to a contract shoula
be allowed to contract into a property rule: they are in the best
position to determine which remedial devices will serve their respective interests most satisfactorily.
IV.

THIRD PARTIES, PENALTIES, AND THE CONVERSION PROBLEM

So far, I have treated property rules and liability rules as
though they were sharply distinguishable, and have implicitly assumed that a particular entitlement will always fall cleanly under
one rule or the other. Following Calabresi and Melamed,1" I have
distinguished property rules from liability rules by their penal character. It is not sufficient to define a property rule as a rule forbidding
the appropriation of an entitlement without the owner's consent. A
rule that forbids such a taking but merely requires a taker to compensate the owner of the right is a liability rule. An owner's right is
protected by a property rule only if the taking triggers the application of some special sanction whose cost to the taker is likely to
exceed the payment he would have to make to compensate the
owner for his loss. 78 In the simplest contract cases, specific performlaw. But the dramatic differences between crime and breach of contract do not suggest that
contract rights should not be protected by property rules and so they do not justify judicial
reluctance to enforce private contractual attempts to create property rule protection.
7' Although they do not make this point explicitly, it is, I believe, implied by their
discussion of criminal sanctions. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 1, at 1124-27.
18The penal nature of the sanction backing up an injunctive order is clearest where noncompliance constitutes a criminal contempt.
[I]f the defendant does that which he has been commanded not to do, the disobedience
is a thing accomplished. Imprisonment cannot undo or remedy what has been done nor
afford any compensation for the pecuniary injury caused by the disobedience. If the
sentence is limited to imprisonment for a definite period, the defendant is furnished no
key, and he cannot shorten the term by promising not to repeat the offense. Such
imprisonment operates, not as a remedy coercive in its nature, but solely as punishment
for the completed act of disobedience.
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442-43 (1911).
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ance vindicates an entitlement protected by a property rule in just
this way. Suppose that Smith promises to sell a unique parcel of
land to Jones. 7 If Smith refuses to deliver the land because he has
received a more attractive offer from Miller, Jones can obtain an
injunction ordering Smith to perform his promise. And if Smith still
refuses to transfer the property to Jones, he may be cited for contempt and fined or imprisoned.
Suppose, however, that instead of merely refusing to sell the
land to Jones, Smith actually sells it to Miller, a good faith purchaser, before Jones learns of the second sale and is able to enjoin
Smith from disposing of the property. The varying judicial responses to this elementary problem suggest three things: first, that the
distinction between property rules and liability rules, while analytically useful, does not capture the full range of entitlementprotecting devices employed in the law of contracts; second, that
the choice of a rule for protecting contractual entitlements may be
affected by considerations other than those already discussed-in
particular, by the interests of third parties; and finally, that in some
cases the law appears to irrationally tolerate the deliberate conversion of property rules to liability rules.
There are three ways in which the courts have treated promisees in Jones's position. Not infrequently, they simply limit the
promisee to his damages remedy, on the ground that specific performance is no longer possible since the property has been conveyed
to an innocent third party. 0 Sometimes, however, a court will impose a constructive trust for the promisee's benefit on the profit
realized by the resale (that is, the difference between the resale price
and the original contract price), even though this may exceed the
damages the promisee has suffered." And finally, on rare occasions,
But even if the contempt is civil in nature, and the sanction imposed by the court
designed merely to coerce compliance with its order, the severity of the sanction (its "cost"
to the defendant) is determined not by what will compensate the injured party but by what
is required to compel the defendant's obedience. See United States v. United Mine Workers,
330 U.S. 258, 304 (1947); Sunbeam Corp. v. Golden Rule Appliance Co., 252 F.2d 467, 469
(1958); Pekelis, Legal Techniques and PoliticalIdeologies: A Comparative Study, 41 MICH.
L. REV. 665, 673-74 (1943).
1, See note 20 supra.

E.g., Harris v. Nelson, 331 Ill. 225, 229-30, 162 N.E. 833, 835 (1928). See also Cushing
v. Levi, 117 Cal. App. 94, 3 P.2d 958 (1951) (original purchaser granted money damages when
the property was sold to a good faith purchaser, the vendor's wife having refused, in bad faith,
to join in the conveyance to the original vendee); Holden v. Efficient Craftsman Corp., 234
N.Y. 437, 138 N.E. 85 (1923).
" "The general principle, upon which this doctrine proceeds, is that, from the time of
the contract for the sale of land, the vendor, as to the land, becomes a trustee for the vendee,
and the vendee, as to the purchase money, a trustee for the vendor, who has a lien upon the
land therefor." J. SToRy, 1 EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 789 (12th ed. 1877). See Krabbenhaft v.
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a court will require the good faith purchaser to retender the property
82
and then compel specific performance of the original contract.
The first approach sanctions the conversion of property rules to
liability rules. If a promisee in Jones's position receives only courtawarded money damages,8 3 he may be undercompensated. Since the
justification for protecting the promisee's original entitlement with
a property rule was to avoid placing this risk on the promisee, it is
puzzling that the promisor should be permitted to impose this risk
by simply breaching his contract and putting himself in a position
where he is unable to perform. These cases would be less disturbing
if there were ground for confidence that courts in measuring the
promisee's money damages treat the resale price of the property as
strong (or conclusive) evidence of its market value. 4 But it is often
difficult to tell from the reported versions of the cases what weight,
if any, has been given to the resale price in calculating damages.
More important, several cases suggest the resale price is just one
factor, among many, that a court may either consider or ignore in
determining the amount of the promisee's damage award.85
A recent illustrative case is Grummel v. Hollenstein.81 Grummel contracted with Hollenstein to make certain improvements on
the latter's property, in return for which Hollenstein promised to
convey to Grummel a portion of the property in question. Grummel
made the improvements, but Hollenstein refused to convey all of the
property to which Grummel was entitled. Part of the property promised Grummel was conveyed to a third party before the initiation
of the lawsuit.
Grummel sued to compel specific performance of Hollenstein's
promise to convey. The trial court refused to grant specific performance, on the ground that it was "impossible to enforce the agreeGossau, 337 Ill. 396, 411, 169 N.E. 258, 264 (1929); Forthman v. Deters, 206 Ill. 159, 173, 69
N.E. 97, 102 (1903); Timko v. Useful Homes Corp., 114 N.J. Eq. 433, 168 A. 824 (1933);
Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W. Va. 738, 759, 11 S.E. 220, 228 (1890). See also POMEPROY, supra
note 17, at § 465.
82E.g., Groves v. Prickett, 420 F.2d 1119, 1122-25 (9th Cir. 1970) (right of first refusal in
sale of stock); cf. Abdallah v. Abdallah, 359 F.2d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 1966) (option to purchase
land).
0 See Milkman v. Ordway, 106 Mass. 232, 253 (1870).
9 If damages were measured in this way, the results of a money damages rule and a
constructive trust approach would coincide in practice, though not in theory.
Cushing v. Levi, 117 Cal. App. 94, 3 P.2d 958 (1933), is illustrative. In Cushing, the
plaintiff agreed to pay $80,000 for some real property. The property was subsequently sold to
a good faith purchaser for $112,500. At trial, the market value of the property at the time of
breach was determined to be $90,000, and the plaintiff was awarded $11,000 in damages-despite the uncontroverted evidence of a higher resale price. This result was affirmed
on appeal.
1190 Ariz. 356, 367 P.2d 960 (1962).
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' since the property had been sold. Instead,
ment of the parties"87
the
trial court awarded Grummel money damages of $40,000. Although
it is unclear how the award was calculated, it appears that the trial
court considered the "value of the land" and the value of the improvements made by Grummel. After trial but before the entry of
judgment against Hollenstein, Grummel discovered the price at
which the property had been sold: $156,000. Grummel petitioned
the trial court to reopen its judgment to consider the newly discovered evidence. The trial court declined to do so.
On appeal, it was held: (1) the trial court had correctly refused
to grant specific performance; (2) having done so, it was justified in
then awarding money damages; and (3) the trial court was also
justified in refusing to reopen its judgment in order to consider
Grummel's new evidence. In so holding, the Supreme Court of Arizona said:

The measure of damages in lieu of specific performance is generally determined by the same rules obtaining in regard to
damages for breach of contract in an action at law. ...
Although we cannot determine the precise formula applied
by the court in arriving at the amount of damages sustained
by the plaintiff, we cannot thereby conclude that the court was
not justified in the figure it reached. Exact damages in a case
of this nature are difficult, if not impossible, to calculate mathematically. ...
[The trial court's refusal to consider Grummel's evidence
of the property's resale price] is a matter lying within the
88
sound discretion of the trial court.
Under the relaxed approach endorsed by the Arizona court, the
difference between resale price and original contract price will often
exceed the damages awarded the promisee. By encouraging the
promisor to believe that he is likely to gain more by selling to a third
party than he will be required to pay in damages to his original
promisee, the approach adopted by the Arizona court increases the
probability that the promisor will breach without having first negotiated a transfer of the promisee's contract rights. To the extent this
is true, the promisee's initial right to compel specific performance
loses its value and degenerates to a liability claim. There is no
justification-certainly no economic one 8 9-for permitting this deliberate conversion of property rules to liability rules.
'

Id. at 359, 367 P.2d at 962.

"

Id. at 360-61, 367 P.2d at 963.
See note 12 supra.
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Under a constructive trust approach, the conversion problem is
less serious. Since it eliminates any profit the promisor might make
by selling the property to someone other than his original promisee,
imposition of a constructive trust should greatly weaken the promisor's incentive to breach the original contract without having first
negotiated a release. But a constructive trust is not inherently
penal: it does not always require a taker to pay more than is necessary to compensate the owner of an entitlement for his loss. On the
other hand, the cost imposed on a breaching party by a constructive
trust is not measured by the estimated harm suffered by the promisee (as is the case with an award of money damages)." In this latter
respect, a constructive trust resembles the injunctive remedies that
are commonly used to prevent the conversion of property rules to
liability rules.
There is, however, one obvious way in which a constructive
trust gives the promisee something less than full property rule protection. If a thief steals a car, and then sells it to a good faith
purchaser, the original owner can retrieve the automobile.', He does
not lose his right to the car because it happens to find its way into
the hands of an innocent third party. By contrast, under a constructive trust approach, a promisee receives only what is sometimes
called "substitutionary" relief 2-something other than the thing
contracted for. If a promisee's entitlement were protected against
conversion to the same extent as a property owner's entitlement to
be free from theft, he would be able to retrieve the promised goods
from a good faith purchaser. There are, in fact, a few cases reaching
this result, albeit in two steps:93 first, the good faith purchaser is
" The award, under a constructive trust approach, is measured by the promisor's benefit
rather than the promisee's loss. Of course, these two amounts may coincide.
[In some cases, however,] a benefit has been received by the defendant but the plaintiff
has not suffered a corresponding loss, or, in some cases, any loss, but nevertheless the
enrichment of the defendant would be unjust. In such cases, the defendant may be under
a duty to give to the plaintiff the amount by which he has been enriched. Thus where a
person with knowledge of the facts wrongfully disposes of the property of another and
makes a profit thereby, he is accountable for the profit and not merely for the value of
the property of the other with which he wrongfully dealt.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 1, Comment e (1937). See also id. at §§ 160, 202.
" See generally 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 14, at §§ 601, 602. A thief does have the power
to invest his purchaser with good title to certain types of property and thereby insulate the
latter from attack by the original owner. Money, instruments in bearer form, and, in certain
situations, goods entrusted to the thief are three notable examples. See U.C.C. §§ 3-202, 3302, 2-403. For a general discussion of the good faith purchase idea in different branches of
commercial law, see Gilmore, The CommercialDoctrineof Good FaithPurchase,63 YALE L.J.
1057 (1954).
92 Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1151
(1970); Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract, in VII INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

COMPARATIVE LAW

(ch. 16) 2 (1976).

" See cases cited at note 82 supra.
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compelled to return the property to the promisor and then the original contract is specifically enforced.
An important economic consideration helps to explain why a
good faith purchaser usually prevails over the prior promisee and
why this rule makes more sense in the law of contracts than an
analogous principle would in the law of theft. In general, it is desirable to avoid a conflict between equally innocent claimants. And it
makes economic sense to put the risk of conflict of this sort on the
party able to prevent it at the lowest cost. Often this will be the
original promisee, who is frequently in the best position to publicize
his interest in the property and thereby put third parties on notice.
The law gives the promisee adequate incentive to publicize his interest by denying him the right to recover the promised property
from a purchaser in good faith.94 This argument applies with less
force to the theft situation. Although it may be expensive for a good
faith purchaser to determine whether his vendor has title to the
goods he is selling, it may well be less expensive for him to do so
than for owners to publicly record their interest in all their property95-especially property in their possession, for possession is
usually adequate notice of a property claim. In short, the constructive trust approach to the conversion problem in contract law is
generally the economically soundest.
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the constructive trust
is its hybrid character. The use of such a trust remedy seems more
consistent than an ordinary damages remedy with the initial decision to protect the entitlement in question with a property rule. On
the other hand, a constructive trust does not accord the promisee a
right to recover his property from a good faith purchaser-a right
11This is perfectly compatible with the use of a constructive trust. In order to give the
promisee an incentive to notify prospective purchasers of the promised property, it is not
necessary to limit his claim against the promisor to money damages. So long as the promisee
cannot recover the property from a good faith purchaser, he will still have an incentive to
put third parties on notice. This incentive will be large if the promisee's remedy against the
promisor is worthless, as when the latter is insolvent or unavailable.
11A full treatment of the economics of good faith purchase is beyond the scope of this
article. An analysis of this sort would have to consider three things: (1) the cost to the initial
claimant of preventing the illicit appropriation of his entitlement (for example, by monitoring
the behavior of the would-be taker or taking precautionary steps to secure his property); (2)
the cost to the initial claimant of publicizing his entitlement; and (3) the cost to the second
purchaser of verifying his transferor's right to dispose of the property in question. These are
obvious considerations, and have no doubt shaped the development of good faith purchase
provisions in many areas of the law (for example, in the law of negotiable instruments). See
U.C.C. §§ 3-301-3-305.
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typically enjoyed by, the victim of theft. The right to insist that a
trust be imposed on the money realized from the sale of the promised property is more than a right to money damages and less than
a right to pursue the property itself into the hands of a good faith
purchaser. It is hard to categorize the trust remedy as either a liability rule or a property rule. Although the distinction between liability
rules and property rules (and the underlying distinction between
compensation and punishment) provides a useful beginning point
for analysis, a rigid insistence on the distinction obscures the fact
that certain remedies exhibit features characteristic of both sorts of
rules, and straddle the line between them. 6

" Calabresi and Melamed point out that property and liability rules may be employed
in varying combinations to protect the entitlements of parties with conflicting interests.
Calabresi & Melamed, supranote 1, at 1122 n.62. They also recognize that different institutions (for example, the courts or political bodies) may be used to achieve the desired combination of rules in any particular case. Id. What they overlook is the complexity and variety of
the legal techniques that have been developed, in different settings, to force the voluntary
market transfer of entitlements. The most striking evidence of this is their failure to discriminate between injunctive relief and criminal sanctions. Compare id. at 1116 (injunctions) with
id. at 1126 (criminal sanctions).

